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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORT LIABILITY-NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION
OR MAINTENANCE OF SWIMMING PooL-[Virginia].-Plaintiff injured her
hand by striking it against a barbed-wire fence while bathing in a swim-
ming pool, evidently formed by fencing a portion of a lake with barbed-wire
extending above and under the water. She sued the municipal corporation
which owned and, without charge, operated the pool, alleging that the fence
had been negligently erected. Held, that a swimming pool owned and oper-
ated by a municipal corporation is a ministerial enterprise, negligent oper-
ation of which makes the defendant city liable in tort.' It is almost uniform
law in this country that a municipal corporation is liable for torts com-
mitted by its agents in the performance of ministerial2 functions but is
immune from liability where torts are committed in performance of govern-
mental functions.3 The courts vary greatly, however, as to what functions
are ministerial rather than governmental, and what tests are significant
in determining a function's classification. 4
The principal case is unique in holding a municipally owned and operated
swimming pool to be ministerial in function in the absence of pecuniary
profit or some dangerous nuisance. There is an exception to the general
American rule 5 holding municipal swimming pools to be governmental, viz.,
that municipal pools are ministerial when operated primarily and substan-
tially for profit. 6 Aside from this exception, whether the municipality
1. Hoggard v. Richmond (Va. 1939) 200 S. E. 610. Contra: Sroufe v.
Garden City (Kan. 1938) 84 P. (2d) 845. Here an infant was drowned in
a municipally owned and operated swimming pool when held in a pipe by
the suction of draining water. His mother sued the defendant city for
damages, alleging negligence in removing an iron grating from the outlet.
Held, that, because a municipal pool is a governmental enterprise, its neg-
ligent maintenance does not give rise to an action in tort against the city.
2. Sometimes called "corporate" or "proprietary."
3. 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) 2869, sec. 1647; Note
(1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 430; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924)
34 Yale L. J. 129. South Carolina and Florida do not determine liability
according to types of functions. See Irvine v. Greenwood (1911) 89 S. C.
511, 72 S. E. 228, holding a municipality immune from all actions in tort;
Kaufman v. Tallahassee (1922) 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 30 A. L. R. 471,
holding that a city with a commission form of government is liable in tort
as is any quasi-public corporation more in the nature of a business than
a government.
4. Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 1196; Freedman, Liability in Tort of Munici-
pal Corporations in Missouri (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rev. 275.
5. Crone v. El Cajou (1933) 133 Cal. App. 624, 24 P. (2d) 846; Hannon
v. Waterbury (1927) 106 Conn. 13, 136 Atl. 876; Jones v. Atlanta (1926)
35 Ga. App. 376, 133 S. E. 521; Mocha v. Cedar Rapids (1927) 204 Iowa
51, 214 N. W. 587; Warren v. Topeka (1928) 125 Kan. 524, 265 Pac. 78,
57 A. L. R. 555; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. State (Md. App.
1937) 195 At]. 571; Bolster v. Lawrence (1917) 225 Mass. 387, L. R. A.
1917B 1285; Heino v. Grand Rapids (1918) 202 Mich. 363, 168 N. W. 512,
L. R. A. 1918F 528; St. John v. St. Paul (1930) 179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W.
170; Coughlan v. Omaha (1919) 103 Neb. 726, 174 N. W. 220; Mola v.
Metropolitan Park Dist. (1935) 181 Wash. 177, 42 P. (2d) 435; Gensch v.
Milwaukee (1922) 179 Wis. 95, 190 N. W. 843; Rome v. London & Lan-
cashire Indemnity Co. (La. App. 1936) 169 So. 132.
6. Carta v. Norwalk (1929) 108 Conn. 697, 145 At. 158; Burton v. Salt
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charges the public for using the pool has not influenced the courts' classi-
fication of swimming pool operation as governmental or ministerial.7 In
line with the majority view of municipal liability for nuisances,8 recovery
in tort has been allowed against a municipal corporation where the injury
resulted from a nuisance connected with the pool.O
The ratio decidendi of the instant case is not impressive.10 The court
maintained that "Furnishing water to the inhabitants of a municipality for
domestic purposes, and furnishing water to inhabitants * * * for the pur-
pose of public swimming * * * are closely allied activities"; that, since
municipal waterworks are universally classed as ministerial enterprises,
municipal swimming pools must be ministerial and not governmental.1
In spite of the court's questionable rationalization, the decision is in
harmony with the modern and desirable trend toward greater liability of
municipal corporations for their agents' torts.12 The possibility that in-
creased liability may lead municipal corporations to increased inspection
and care in the administration of public facilities makes this decision so-
cially justifiable. T. B.
SALEs-CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT TERmS AS TO TitlE or DELiVERY-
"ON OR BEFOR AT BurnE's OPTION"--[ARKANSAS].-A contract to sell
goods called for immediate shipment of a part of the goods to a designated
place, "balance as ordered within six months." A year after the stated
period had expired, the seller sued the buyer, who had failed to order, for
breach of contract. Held, for defendant, the buyer's right to order being
construed as an option whereby he might advance the time for delivery, and
the seller's duty to deliver during the period being absolute and not condi-
tional on the buyer's order.'
The question confronting the courts in the construction of contracts of
sale calling for delivery during a specified period "as ordered" or calling
for delivery "on or before - at buyer's option" is whether an order or
notice by the buyer is a condition precedent or a mere privilege of demand-
ing delivery before the end of the period. The decision turns on the court's
view of what the parties intended as deduced from the words of the contract
and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In the few cases con-
struing contracts similar to the one involved in the instant case, where the
Lake City (1926) 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443, 51 A. L. R. 364; Belton v.
Ellis (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 254 S. W. 1023. Incidental profit is not suffi-
cient to place a municipal pool in the ministerial class. Petty v. Atlanta
(1929) 40 Ga. App. 63, 148 S. E. 747.
7. See cases cited supra, note 5.
8. Note (1931) 75 A. L. R. 1196.
9. Hoffman v. Bristol (1931) 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499, 75 A. L. R.
1191 (civil action for damages, dangerous diving board).
10. Hoggard v. Richmond (Va. 1939) 200 S. E. 610, 616. Contrast the
more logical dissenting opinion. 200 S. E. at 616.
11. Id. at 615.
12. Note (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 430.
1. Pictorial Paper Package Corp. v. Swamp & Dixie Laboratories, Inc.
(Ark. 1938) 122 S. W. (2d) 529.
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